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“Things happen to you they happen”: Cormac McCarthy, Morality and Neo-
Naturalism 
While certain critics have noted particular affinities between Cormac McCarthy’s writing and 
that of earlier generations of American naturalists, that element of his novels has rarely been 
granted sustained attention. In general, critics have identified only a relatively loose 
determinism in novels such as Outer Dark (1968), Blood Meridian (1985) and The Crossing 
(1994). McCarthy’s post-9/11 novels, No Country for Old Men (2005) and The Road (2006), 
require a reconsideration of the way in which his work relates to naturalism. Elements in 
these novels suggest that a more clearly deterministic naturalism has become increasingly 
significant in McCarthy’s work. This essay offers a perspective on McCarthy’s increased 
engagement with naturalism in these works, and the wider ethical and political implications 
of this development. Beginning with a commentary on naturalism, and its manifestation in 
America, we then consider the form’s resurgence in twenty-first-century American culture. 
After a brief survey of McCarthy’s relationship to naturalism in his twentieth-century work, 
the essay concludes with a closer examination of naturalist tendencies in No Country and The 
Road.  
Naturalism, American Naturalism and Neo-Naturalism  
In its literary form, naturalism emerged in the late nineteenth century as a mode of writing 
which purported to enable the author to conduct an experiment into how human lives are 
governed by internal and external forces. Émile Zola is the figure most fully associated with 
the emergence of the form in terms of its carefully considered philosophical principles, which 
demanded that the author withdraw from his/her creation once an initial scenario is 
constructed, allowing deterministic forces to decide the characters’ fortunes. With regard to 
his early novel Thérèse Raquin (1868), for example, Zola declares that in constructing the 
two main characters, he “set [him]self certain problems and solved them for the interest of the 
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thing” (1962: 20). If this sounds as though Zola is advocating that artists disavow control 
over their creations, then this is at least supported by a sincerely held belief in the 
opportunities to discover elements of human behaviour granted by the contemporary 
sciences. In ‘The Experimental Novel’, Zola argues that naturalist writers must,  
bring into our studies of nature and man the decisive tool of the experimental method. 
In one word, we should operate on the characters, the passions, on the human and 
social data, in the same way that the chemist and the physicist operate on inanimate 
beings, and as the psychologist operates on living beings. Determinism dominates 
everything. It is scientific investigation, it is experimental reasoning. (1965: 277) 
Zola thus attempts nothing less than to reorient literature away from romanticism, in favour 
of a strictly scientific form of experimentation into the deterministic underpinnings of the 
universe in general, and human behaviour in particular. 
One key component of both European and American naturalism is thus their basis in a 
deterministic understanding of the universe, which produces a conception of humans who are 
able to exercise, at best, only highly circumscribed free will. In naturalism, this often 
manifests as a highly pessimistic – sometimes nihilistic – worldview: protagonists of 
naturalism are typically dominated or overwhelmed by forces greater than themselves and 
outside their control. American naturalism has often been understood as less fully committed 
to a mechanistically deterministic universe than its European counterpart. This is partly 
because of its basis in a cultural formation produced from a different set of industrial and 
social circumstances, alongside more simple resistance to the idea that European naturalist 
doctrines translate straightforwardly into American culture. Eric Carl Link, for example, 
observes that “Zola’s strict rejection of romanticism, his call for purely objective scientific 
documentation and observation, and his positivism do not characterize much naturalistic 
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narrative, especially in America” (2004: 7). This is maybe overstating American naturalism’s 
disavowal of the scientific method and its commitment to a deterministic worldview, 
especially as it discounts the differences between the several periodic revivals of American 
naturalism. And so while nineteenth- and twentieth-century forms of American naturalism 
were less committed to determinism, a characteristic in sympathy with its openness to the 
incorporation of other discourses and forms, determinism has nevertheless always been a 
strong component of the form, even in America. Indeed, more recent resurgent forms of 
naturalism in American are arguably more committed to determinism than any form of 
naturalism, European or American, since Zola. This most recent resurgence – which has 
influenced American artistic production in the period between the events of September 11th, 
2001, and the election of Donald Trump as President – arguably seems more deterministic as 
it reflects a sense that in neoliberal America individuals’ choices are diminished, and that 
behaviour is thus determined.1 This increased level of determinism is also significant given 
another key implication underpinning this essay: namely, that if determinism means 
characters lack free will, then they are not responsible for their actions, and therefore cannot 
be held morally to account. This is a crucial observation in terms of the ideology of twenty-
first-century American naturalism; as discussed below, there are particular reasons deriving 
from the political and cultural landscape of twenty-first-century America for individuals to be 
reluctant to assume personal responsibility. 
 It is necessary to ask what significance the particular characteristics of American 
naturalism might hold for McCarthy’s relationship with the form, and how these manifest in 
his work. Firstly, we should consider the influence of the romance form on the American 
novel tradition, which from Richard Chase’s mid-twentieth-century criticism onwards has 
been identified as more closely allied to romanticism than the classic realist text of 
nineteenth-century Europe. This is also true of American naturalism, which has been mapped 
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onto romanticism just as fully as it has onto realism. Tellingly, this is a link made precisely in 
the context of McCarthy’s work; Stephen Frye, one of the most enduring and dedicated of 
McCarthy’s critics, employs the term “romantic naturalism” (2007: 48) in order to describe 
The Crossing. Key components of this romantic naturalism in McCarthy and elsewhere are a 
reduced commitment both to detailed realist representation and to determinism, otherwise 
crucial elements of the naturalism of Zola and the Europeans. In McCarthy’s twentieth-
century novels, where naturalism is generally a less prominent discourse than in the later 
works, it indeed tends to be subordinate to mythic, symbolic, or anti-realist elements more 
commonly identified with romanticism. A realist determinism is, at least in these earlier 
works, clearly a lesser concern. 
American naturalism’s weaker philosophical rigour – especially in terms of 
determinism – in comparison to the theoretical zeal of Zola and the Europeans, has further 
implications. One result is that American naturalism has been, as Keith Newlin describes it, 
“an adaptive genre” (5), more amenable to assimilation alongside other forms, discourses, 
ideologies, and philosophies. This looser commitment to determinism meant that American 
naturalism could be incorporated within other forms – Newlin, for example, foregrounds its 
close relationship with melodrama – and accommodated alongside other ideas. American 
naturalism thus becomes a more hybrid form, where determinism is seen in tandem with 
other key elements, such as “reformism, sensationalism, and persistent assertion of human 
free will” (Howard 40). Consequently, naturalism in America has a proven longevity 
compared to its European counterpart. This is partly because although naturalism has its roots 
in a particular cultural moment – most notably the late nineteenth-century emergence of 
evolutionary theory – in America in particular it has itself evolved and adapted to other 
circumstances, producing periodic resurgences of literary interest in its forms and ideas. 
Often, these resurgences can be partly attributed to artists’ perception of “living in a perilous 
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time, a period of change and uncertainty …. Naturalism is a literary form that struggles to 
accommodate that sense of discomfort and danger” (Howard ix). If this is true, then given the 
vicissitudes of life in the United States in the early twenty-first century the re-emergence of 
naturalism should not only be no surprise, but actually expected. 
If we accept that twenty-first-century America has witnessed a resurgence of what 
might be termed neo-naturalism, it is necessary to account for the cultural conditions that 
have helped to bring this about. Firstly, one should be cautious regarding naturalism’s 
validity in the world of the late-twentieth and twenty-first centuries. After all, having learned 
lessons from postmodernism we might be sceptical regarding not only the capacity of 
language to reflect, rather than construct, reality, but also both biological and environmental 
determinism. That “environment” is now understood as a socially constructed notion, for 
example, means that naturalist art needs to relate to the late capitalist world in an arguably 
more sophisticated way compared to how it engaged with late nineteenth-century 
industrialised America. Nevertheless, particular tenets of naturalism are strongly detectable in 
a significant group of American works from the first decades of the twenty-first century. The 
ideologies of these texts are highly revealing. A key element in this respect is the greatly 
diminished capacity for free will in neo-naturalism, which is frequently more deterministic – 
indeed, more congruent with the doctrines of Zola – than earlier forms of American 
naturalism. This may be attributable to a number of cultural conditions, such as the perceived 
lack of agency endured by the majority of the American population in a society driven by 
neoliberal economics. Another factor may be the way in which the subject of a deterministic 
universe is not free to choose, and is therefore popularly taken to be absolved from moral 
judgement. This is crucial to the early twenty-first-century American social, political, and 
cultural context, wherein, post-9/11 we witness the construction of a sense of collective 
trauma which was shaped by the Bush administration and mass media into a sense of shared 
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victimhood (see Gibbs 120-5). This process enables the ideological construction of an acted 
upon and victimised America, therefore blameless for actions it takes as a consequence. In 
terms of foreign policy these actions include the “War on Terror”, extensive and continuing 
forays into the Middle East, and the use of drones as mechanisms of terror. Domestic 
measures include the curbing of civil liberties in laws such as the Patriot Act, and neoliberal 
economic policies producing ever starker inequalities of wealth. For perpetrators or 
supporters of acts such as these, it may be useful to conceive of the self as acting in response 
to more or less overwhelming forces, as a means of abnegating moral responsibility. It is this 
essay’s argument that such a stance (or a critique of this position) is detectable in the neo-
naturalist cultural production of this period. 
Broadly stated, there is a significant body of cultural production which engages in 
various ways with a political stance which seeks to position twenty-first-century Americans – 
as individuals and collectively – as victims, prey to overwhelming exterior forces, and 
therefore devoid of moral responsibility. Alongside McCarthy’s stronger relationship with 
naturalism during this period, naturalist fiction, or works containing prominent naturalist 
elements, includes texts as diverse as Philipp Meyer’s American Rust, Annie Proulx’s 
Barkskins, plus a number of her short stories, Lionel Shriver’s Big Brother and The 
Mandibles, Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America, Paul Auster’s Man in the Dark, Jess 
Walter’s The Financial Lives of the Poets, and Dave Eggers’ Your Fathers, Where Are They? 
And the Prophets, Do They Live Forever?2 Somewhat simplifying, for reasons of clarity, 
these overtly deterministic neo-naturalist texts, featuring protagonists who are the victims of 
forces beyond their control and therefore morally blameless for their actions, strike a 
particular attitude towards this ideology of victimhood, depending in large part on the level of 
sympathy the text encourages towards its protagonist(s). Such texts thus offer either tacit 
support or a critique of a wider American self-conception as victim, depending on the 
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political stance of the writer or, in the case of films and TV, the production team and 
company involved. This diverse array of cultural products includes McCarthy’s two major 
twenty-first-century novels, No Country and The Road.3 These novels can clearly be 
conceived as part of this broader neo-naturalist trend – albeit with a complex political 
relationship to the form – especially their incorporation of a more overtly deterministic 
framework than McCarthy’s earlier forays into naturalism. Before examining the two novels, 
however, we should trace naturalism-oriented criticism of McCarthy’s earlier work, and 
consider the ways in which these texts draw, albeit less overtly, on ideas and discourses 
associated with naturalism. Certainly, a number of critical interpretations note naturalism as 
an element in McCarthy’s writing, even though it is not generally understood as dominant. If 
naturalism is usually seen in tandem with other forms and discourses in American writing, 
this is strongly the case in McCarthy’s work, where it sits alongside, for example, 
Gnosticism, Nietzschean materialism, and existential Christianity. It is a typical move for 
critics to observe in each of McCarthy’s novels this complex blend of discourses, forms, 
registers, and ideologies, Frye perhaps putting it best when referring to McCarthy as “a 
consummate aesthetic alchemist” (2013: 10). 
McCarthy and Naturalism  
For most critics, naturalism indeed tends to be one element among many in McCarthy’s 
work, even if it is explicitly noted.4 In his twentieth-century work, most critics agree, 
McCarthy produces hybrid texts, of which naturalism is frequently a significant component. 
Besides those naturalistic elements previously identified by critics, there are several others in 
McCarthy’s twentieth-century work. His settings, for example, are archetypally naturalist: 
“primitive, wild, or stripped-down environments or landscapes” where society and 
civilisation barely, if at all, exist (Link 2013: 154). As in classic naturalism, humans are 
highly evolved animals, part of a natural world which is nevertheless implacable and cruel. 
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These environments are pertinent to all McCarthy’s texts, but especially the setting of The 
Road, where humankind most vividly reverts to animal. In these unforgiving settings 
McCarthy’s protagonists generally endure a downward narrative trajectory of degeneration 
familiar from earlier works of naturalism. These characters’ striking lack of interiority may 
also be taken as a signal of naturalist influence. Aside from Sherriff Bell in No Country, and 
sporadic instances elsewhere in his oeuvre which include the Man in The Road, McCarthy 
does not allow access to the consciousness of his protagonists, despite the fact that his 
narrators, being invariably heterodiegetic, are potentially omniscient. As a result, the reader is 
more likely to understand characters’ actions as being explicitly motivated by unwilled 
factors, especially those external to the self, that is, environmentally determined. As also 
reflected in their general inarticulacy and absence of a capacity for ethical contemplation, 
protagonists of McCarthy’s novels, such as Culla Holme in Outer Dark or Lester Ballard in 
Child of God, are as archetypally naturalist as his settings. They are, moreover, almost 
exclusively from poor backgrounds, and subject to overwhelming forces and sequences of 
events outside their control, in other words, very much the direct descendants of the hapless 
characters of earlier generations of naturalism.  
As an example, we might consider The Crossing, a novel whose sections concerning 
the wolf evoke Jack London’s work. The behaviour of the protagonist Billy Parham 
demonstrates McCarthy’s customary absence of explanatory interiority. Thus the motivation 
for his three journeys south across the border is vague and at best implied, rather than 
explicitly stated. One key effect of this is that Billy seems constantly more often acted upon 
than exercising agency, or at least this is how the reader perceives him, because of this lack 
of interiority. To be more precise regarding this issue of absent interiority, we might ask 
whether this is the purpose of McCarthy’s literary technique of not dramatizing 
consciousness. That is, one of the key reasons McCarthy in general refuses to allow the 
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narrator access to his protagonists’ thoughts and motivations, is to reinforce the sense that the 
characters he constructs are lacking in agency, and these acted-upon subjects, redolent of 
classic naturalism, are at the mercy of an implacable and overwhelming universe. 
No Country for Old Men 
The existence of naturalism as a discourse in McCarthy’s work is clearly well established , but 
this essay’s key question in relation to No Country and The Road is whether there is a change 
– in character, orientation, and strength – in McCarthy’s use of naturalism post-9/11. That is, 
while deprived and damaged characters are an essential element in McCarthy’s fiction from 
The Orchard Keeper (1965) on, it seems that the recent novels are constructed more overtly 
as experiments into the behaviour of humans confronted by dire circumstances. Firstly, it is 
not controversial to observe that the whole narrative arc and the key themes in No Country 
are philosophically linked to naturalism. To recall the earlier point regarding interiority, for 
example, this clearly applies to Moss in No Country, where it is never explicitly stated why 
he returns with water to the dying Mexican, an action which leads ultimately – in classic 
naturalistic fashion – to his downfall. Although the reader likely infers that Moss performs 
this act because of ethical impulses, this is never stated, and it is impossible to confirm, as we 
don’t have access to his consciousness. As with other protagonists where McCarthy allows no 
interiority, Moss thus becomes something of a blank slate, apparently more acted upon or 
driven by impulse than enjoying active agency. This has implications for readers keen to 
make ethical judgements regarding characters, since as philosopher David Hume observed, 
intention is important in judging the morality others’ actions. When we praise or condemn the 
morality of particular actions we are actually evaluating “the motives that produced them, and 
considering the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper” 
(qtd. in Norton 161). Specifically, Moss’s lack of interiority, as with other of McCarthy’s 
protagonists, prevents the reader from reaching moral judgements regarding his behaviour. 
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While No Country draws on elements of naturalism employed in McCarthy’s earlier 
work, these elements are more prominent, with a particular exploration of the relationship 
between determinism and morality. This preoccupation emerges through the novel’s focus on 
chance and fate as determining factors, which are embodied most prominently by Anton 
Chigurh. With his coin flips that determine whether a victim is to live or die, Chigurh 
ostensibly becomes this novel’s agent of implacable determinism. The motif of the coin, 
Chigurh’s chosen instrument of fate, , notwithstanding that it echoes and amplifies similar 
motifs in Blood Meridian and All the Pretty Horses, reinforces the novel’s allusions to money 
and finance, and via them to the specific period in which it is set, at the start of Reaganism. 
Andrew Hoberek observes that this period setting encourages us to read No Country “as a 
fabular prehistory of the rise of the contemporary right” (490), an interpretation supported by 
the otherwise jarring scenes set in the corporate office block. Amongst other things, 
Chigurh’s coin, and the preoccupation with money and finance help to reinforce the 
suggestion that rather than exclusively representing an exploration of universal evil, No 
Country is also rooted in a specific historical period, something, as noted above, almost 
universally true of naturalist fiction. 
Partly through Chigurh’s use of the coin, determinism often manifests in No Country 
as blind fate, a seemingly overwhelming force which strips characters of agency. This is a 
tendentious way of understanding determinism, which is not – as Zola was keen to observe – 
to be equated with fatalism.  While determinism provides the conditions for certain 
phenomena and consequent behaviour, fatalism for Zola is inescapable: “the moment that we 
can act, and that we do act, on the determining cause of phenomena – by modifying their 
surroundings, for example – we cease to be fatalists” (1965: 281). In other words, 
determinism envisages phenomena having the potential to determine behaviour in specified 
ways, but this is not to be confused with the inexorable teleology of fate. In No Country, 
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however, determinism and fatalism become blurred and conflated in ways which have 
profound implications for readers’ judgement of characters’ actions. For example, late in the 
novel Moss claims to have been dragged into a situation outside his control (again, because of 
the one act of returning to give water to the dying Mexican): “Three weeks ago I was a law 
abidin citizen. Workin a nine to five job…. Things happen to you they happen. They dont ask 
first. They dont require your permission” (220). This shows most clearly the effect of 
McCarthy’s denying characters interiority and thus motivation. In other words, although 
Moss can be said to have taken the decision to return to aid the Mexican – however much he 
felt compelled to do so – because of the way in which the text absents interiority and 
therefore agency from the scenario, Moss is presented as being acted upon, from which it is 
but a short step to the impression of overwhelmed victimhood.  
 Chigurh’s position in this scenario is more complicated, on the one hand apparently 
acting as the novel’s mysterious agent of implacable determinism, and on the other constantly 
insisting that his potential victims exercised choice in settling their own fate before they even 
encountered him. The novel’s most conspicuous conflation of determinism and fatalism 
occurs in Chigurh’s utterances, as revealed when one appreciates that the coin tosses which 
Chigurh presents as deterministic are in fact nothing of the sort. That is, the link between the 
originating cause – the coin toss – and the consequential action is wholly artificial, and 
existentially chosen by Chigurh. His presentation of the coin toss as stripping him of agency 
and therefore responsibility is thus entirely spurious. In his final confrontation with Moss’s 
wife, Carla Jean, for example, Chigurh tells her, “Every moment in your life is a turning and 
every one a choosing. Somewhere you made a choice. All followed to this. The accounting is 
scrupulous. The shape is drawn” (259). Ostensibly, there is a very curious contradiction here 
between (limited) choice, chance and a non-negotiable, inevitable fate that the choices 
produce. Chigurh asserts that an originating choice determines characters’ fates (this is 
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repeated in the scene where he confronts and then kills Carson Wells, the hitman assigned to 
deal with him). Thus he continues with Carla Jean: “When I came into your life your life was 
over. It had a beginning, a middle, and an end. This is the end. You can say that things could 
have turned out differently. That they could have been some other way. But what does that 
mean? They are not some other way. They are this way” (260). Through such reasoning – 
which is highly dubious at best – Chigurh is able to absolve himself of an active role and thus 
moral blame in the murders he perpetrates. In order to do so, however, he has had to conflate 
a destiny that he has in fact decided with factors that determined decisions a character made 
previously, which is clearly a questionable ideological manoeuvre.  
There is therefore a problem when critics have taken Chigurh’s reasoning at face 
value rather than, as James Wood witheringly dismissed it, “high-flown nonsense.” With 
regard to Chigurh’s refusal to call the coin for the gas station proprietor he is threatening, for 
example, Timothy Parrish, seems to concede Chigurh’s insistence that “the man’s fate is his 
to make” (73), as if Chigurh can legitimately employ an existential discourse in a 
deterministic world. Lydia Cooper is more sceptical of Chigurh’s obfuscating rhetoric, 
describing how his “‘principles’ involve his absolute adherence to seemingly arbitrary 
promises, like a victim’s life depending on a coin toss, and thus reflect Chigurh’s allegiance 
to a world of rules that does not mesh with the rules of most civilized human societies” 
(2009: 48). While this suggests that although Chigurh’s moral code is repugnant it is 
nevertheless coherent and consistent, Cooper does subsequently note how Chigurh constantly 
“lies and manipulates to accomplish his work” (2009: 51).  
Frye is the critic who examines Chigurh’s pronouncements at greatest length, and his 
reading is thus worth considering in detail. Certainly, Frye seems initially unconvinced by 
Chigurh’s sophistry, describing it as “an inexplicable set of principles grounded in a vaguely 
articulated deterministic philosophy. Chigurh contends that his free choice to kill is mitigated 
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by an elaborate system of cause and effect that renders individual agency largely 
inconsequential” (2009: 156). In other words, Frye notes the inconsistency between the 
existentialist and deterministic discourses Chigurh switches between, and that this may even 
signal his “presumed insanity” (2009:160). It is therefore surprising that Frye also declares 
that Chigurh’s “worldview is well considered and philosophically constituted” (Frye 
2009:160), as particularly revealed, Frye suggests, in the final confrontation with Wells. This 
overlooks, however, the instrumental way in which Chigurh appropriates particular elements 
of determinism and distorts them into a form of fatalism in order to justify his actions.  
Indeed, Frye eventually notes just how perverse is Chigurh’s articulation of his theory 
of ineluctable fate based on earlier choices, since for Chigurh, “the fact that [he] could act out 
of free will, choosing not to kill, is from his point of view a comforting illusion devoid of 
truth” (2009:161). In other words, Chigurh performs a move now becoming familiar to us, 
whereby he absolves himself from potential accusations of moral blame by denying his own 
agency, using a mode of fatalism disguised as determinism. Chigurh’s own disingenuousness 
regarding choice is revealed in the conversation with Wells, where he refers to his having 
been previously “hurt”, and how this changed him to the extent that it is possible his 
philosophy regarding fate can be traced to this moment (173). As elsewhere, Chigurh posits 
himself as someone acted upon, as a victim of circumstances, not responsible for his actions. 
In contrast to later dealings with his victims it is noticeable that there is no reference in this 
scene to how his choices led him to his “hurt”. Chigurh’s argument in the scene with Carla 
Jean is similarly riddled with inconsistencies, not least since it entails settling upon an 
arbitrary starting point for the determinants which allegedly produced her fate, as well as 
discounting factors which may have determined that initial choice. Frye points out that 
Chigurh misleadingly “presents the coin toss as the one chance to chart the sequence 
differently and preserve [Carla Jean’s] life. From his perspective, he is merely an actor in a 
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rigidly determined historical process” (2009:161). Thus Chigurh is simultaneously merely the 
agent of a force greater than himself, and yet he did not have to present Carla Jean with 
another chance, but in fact chose to do so. He thereby again speciously conflates determinism 
(as fatalism) with existentialism. During this scene although Chigurh accepts his role – 
conceived as largely passive – in the events, the situation overall is alleged to have originated 
in Carla Jean’s choices. This is a judgement whose harshness is only exacerbated when one 
considers that it is actually her husband’s choices that are predominantly responsible for her 
predicament. Through these fallacious pronouncements, the killer uses faux-deterministic 
arguments as an ideological tool to abnegate responsibility and deny his own agency. By 
interpreting a deterministic universe as a fatalistic one, Chigurh neatly places himself in a 
position entirely free of moral responsibility, thus sidestepping conventional western moral 
perspectives which would condemn his acts as evil.  
To clarify what is at stake here, we might compare Chigurh’s position to a particular 
contemporary context, specifically the renewed interest in the “Just World Hypothesis” (also 
known as the “Just World Fallacy”), a psychological concept concerning cognitive bias that 
encourages observers to blame the victims of particular events for their own fate, on the basis 
that the universe rewards and punishes fairly.5 According to this ideology, sufferers – victims 
of traumatising experiences, for example – have somehow chosen the wrong path, and 
thereby brought their fate upon themselves. This cognitive bias is, as Claire Andre and 
Manuel Velasquez observe, “continually reinforced in the ubiquitous fairy tales, fables, 
comic books, cop shows and other morality tales of our culture, in which good is always 
rewarded and evil punished.” Clearly, the Just World Hypothesis is entirely consistent with 
the perverse conflation of fatalism and determinism espoused by Chigurh. The ideology of 
Chigurh, which blames the victim for a fate of which he is the mere instrument, sits 
comfortably alongside other popular twenty-first-century neoliberal demands aimed at, for 
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example, justifying the shrinking of America’s already limited social security system in the 
name of rugged individualism. In other words, neoliberal policies aimed at limiting welfare 
implicitly embrace the same underlying ideology as the Just World Hypothesis, that is, a 
belief in a fair universe inhabited by a populace deserving of their fates. Understanding 
Chigurh’s ethical code as a version of the Just World Hypothesis enables us to see more 
clearly the ideological uses to which the latter might be put, in terms of morally justifying 
heinous actions by placing the responsibility for such acts upon their victims. According to 
this interpretation, Chigurh’s embracing of a universe in which he is a mere agent, confirming 
the fate of others who have made their free choices, is an act of sheer opportunism. His 
worldview perverts determinism into a form of fatalism as a means of shifting the 
responsibility for the murders he perpetrates onto his victims. That the Just World Hypothesis 
is espoused using such sophistry, and by an arguably sociopathic character, should perhaps 
encourage us to read No Country, in part, as a critique of such ideologies.   
 Besides using the Just World Hypothesis, it should be noted that the peculiar 
juxtaposition of existential choice, determinism, and fatalism, can be reconciled through other 
forms of doublethink familiar in an American context. The ideologies of American 
Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny, for example, similarly enable an American self-
conception that reconciles elements of aggressive action and agency through deterministic 
thinking. On a more local level, under ideologies of American Exceptionalism the United 
States grants itself agency, while simultaneously locating its citizens as blameless victims. 
These are ideologies granting the US a kind of special licence, for example, to carry out 
aggressive acts in the name of self-preservation or the extension of democratic values. Such a 
perspective is reflected in the position of Chigurh in No Country, but also echoes through The 
Road. Looking further back historically, and appreciating the roots of these ideas in 
Puritanism and Calvinism, allows us to appreciate how notions of predestination were 
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reconciled with apparently contradictory worldviews, such as free will, to carry out “Godly” 
acts. In this sense, the kind of non-Manichean doublethink employed by Chigurh in No 
Country is less riven with contradiction than a non-American context may lead us to think. 
Ideologies such as American Exceptionalism are important in the twenty-first-century context 
of McCarthy’s employment of naturalism, since to varying degrees they share the political 
will to resist moral responsibility through positing – when it is convenient to the self to do so 
– a deterministic universe. Drawing on ideologies such as these, and the Just World Fallacy, 
and working them through a contemporary naturalist form, enables McCarthy to explore 
contemporary American attitudes towards moral responsibility. One must constantly bear in 
mind, however, that Chigurh’s fatalism is, to reiterate, a misrepresentation of determinism. 
While Chigurh is superficially a mouthpiece for naturalist ideologies in No Country, it is 
impossible to ignore that he misunderstands – wilfully or not – the determinism which is at 
naturalism’s core. In this respect, No Country represents McCarthy’s critique of those who 
would similarly misrepresent determinism as a way of escaping moral responsibility.  
The Road 
In The Road, determinism is again one discourse among many, including the novel’s heavy 
religious coding, but we might also notice the changed tenor of naturalism compared to 
McCarthy’s earlier work. Adam Mars-Jones’s review described the novel as a “thought and 
feeling experiment,” while Paul Sheehan similarly notes that “McCarthy poses a simple 
question: how much can be pared away from human existence for it still to qualify as ‘life’?” 
(91) Both comments are clearly pertinent, since naturalism from Zola’s “The Experimental 
Novel” onwards has been conceived as a form of enquiry into human behaviour, frequently, 
as in the case of The Road, pitting a subject against the overwhelming forces of the universe 
in order to see how much stress it can bear. The Road is in this sense a direct descendent of 
Zola’s naturalist experimental doctrines, asking how much we can strip away from the world 
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and from its human inhabitants before they cease to be humans as we recognise them, or 
before they lose the will to live.  
Determinism pervades this novel, where even the title (and constant references to the 
road within) implies straitened choices, and therefore an absence of free will. From the very 
beginning, elements of the narrative structure underscore the novel’s emphasis on the 
restricted circumstances in which its protagonists dwell: “When he woke in the woods in the 
dark and the cold of the night he’d reach out and touch the child sleeping beside him” (1). 
The mode of iterative narration and the repetition of the definite article specify that these are 
routine occurrences, and that the protagonists are locked into particular and repetitive forms 
of behaviour. This opening is only reinforced by other narrative strategies, including the 
largely linear structure, with very occasional analepses. The narration also maintains a regular 
pace, with the occasional exception of a pause for some extremely detailed description, which 
is nevertheless a further typical feature of naturalist fiction. A concordance of the novel 
confirms the repetitiveness and restrictedness of the language used, both of which underline 
the protagonists’ limited range of choices.6 Given the extraordinarily wide vocabulary of 
McCarthy’s other novels, this pared down language is clearly a deliberate strategy, designed 
to evoke the reduced circumstances endured by the Man and the Boy. Indeed, the diminution 
of available language – mirroring the world it describes – is even addressed, in the much-
quoted passage describing an environment “shrinking down about a raw core of parsible 
entities. The names of things slowly following those things into oblivion. Colors. The names 
of birds. Things to eat. Finally the names of things one believed to be true” (93). Language 
diminishes first around simple object labels, then concerning ideas, clearly demonstrating that 
options for humankind in the hostile environment of this novel’s twilight of the 
Anthropocene have narrowed to a stark Sisyphean choice between suicide and a scavenged 
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continued existence. The novel’s sparse language thus reinforces and complements the 
conventionally naturalistic narrative structure of the plot of decline. 
Other elements reinforce McCarthy’s extensive drawing on the form and content of 
naturalism in The Road. For example, the novel is replete with minutely detailed descriptions, 
often of ostensibly mundane items – such as the number of available bullets for the Man’s 
pistol – which, in the harshly deterministic environment of this novel, suddenly assume life-
or-death importance. The detailed descriptions of building and lighting a fire take this a stage 
further, not only emphasising how survival depends upon the success of this enterprise, but 
also thereby again specifically evoking Jack London, this time his celebrated naturalist short 
story, “To Build a Fire”. As with that story’s unnamed protagonist, the Man and Boy live in 
an environment wherein, “[i]f they got wet they would probably die” (14). Such small, 
seemingly insignificant elements become telling determinants of behaviour in this stripped-
down environment. They explicitly evoke, moreover, classic texts, forms, and ideas from 
earlier iterations of American naturalism. The notion of the insignificant becoming significant 
indeed supplies a link between the two novels, thereby providing further potential 
illumination of McCarthy’s perspective during their composition. In No Country, Chigurh’s 
discourse to the shopkeeper notes that “just a coin … [n]othing special” can nevertheless 
become “an instrument” in the decision as to whether an encounter with Chigurh will result 
in fatality (57). Although the two novels thus share this classic naturalist fascination with the 
importance of minutiae, there is an important difference, as we shall see, between Chigurh 
artificially elevating this small detail and the authentic and innate life-or-death significance of 
such elements in The Road 
These examples raise the question of how we should interpret McCarthy’s stronger 
commitment to a deterministic universe in The Road. One important element in this regard is 
the apparent lack of choice facing the characters in the post-apocalyptic environment, a 
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feature underlined by some of these formal attributes. For example, when they approach a 
house which is later revealed to hold imprisoned amputees awaiting death and 
cannibalisation, the Boy is terrified and reluctant to go in, whereas his father insists, “We’ve 
got to find something to eat. We have no choice” (112, emphasis added). Later, when they 
discuss whether to venture into another house (this is affected by their earlier experience, and 
so the Boy is even more unwilling), the Man insists, “we have to take a look. There’s no 
place else to go” (145, emphasis added). Interestingly, at this later point, choice – albeit 
limited – is now mapped onto a moral dichotomy: “This is it …. This is what the good guys 
do. They keep trying. They dont give up” (145). This is especially significant if, as is 
generally accepted, naturalism’s deterministic universe strips agency and therefore removes a 
capacity for moral judgement. This exchange suggests that the furthest extent of ethical 
judgements in this straitened world are a kind of Hobbesian ethical egoism, or towards the 
more utilitarian end of Spinoza’s philosophy, whereby “whatever is good is good in case it 
serves as a means to, or as a constituent of, perseverance in being. Bad things are bad in case 
they diminish or obstruct perseverance” (Youpa 243). In this case, despite their highly 
circumscribed free will, the Man insists that a moral imperative nevertheless pertains, albeit 
in this case with the ulterior motive of persuading the Boy to comply. After all, as Spinoza 
concedes, for beings lacking in freedom – and the Man and the Boy are perfect examples – 
just remaining alive “long enough to become free, or more free, may override the value of a 
particular act of honesty” (Youpa 255).  
Later still, when deciding whether to risk eating some jars of preserved vegetables 
that they have found, the reader encounters this telling exchange:  
What do you think? the man said. 
I think we’ve got no choice. (221, emphasis added) 
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In other words, there is a limit to the determinism here: the Boy has the agency to consider, to 
think, almost in fact to choose, that they have no choice. The point here is that this is a novel 
which carefully considers notion of choice, but in which there are clear restrictions upon it, 
and elements in the environment that at times clearly determine behaviour. Moreover, the 
lack of choice is suggested to have clear ethical implications which draw on a tradition of 
naturalist fiction whereby readers are not positioned to pass moral judgement upon 
characters. Other perspectives might be brought to this passage to demonstrate its importance 
to the novel. A Frankfurt School reading, for example, would interpret the Boy’s deciding 
that they have the freedom to recognise that they have no choice as evoking the false aura of 
choices offered by neoliberal capitalism. Again, this usefully ties the novel into the specific 
context of neoliberal capitalism, where choices are permitted but within severely restricted 
limits, and often with no truly desirable outcome. Neoliberalism indeed proffers such a 
doublethink regarding choice: for example, the free market operates similarly to the Just 
World Hypothesis, ideologically positing itself as fair and natural, while the individual is by 
contrast responsible for their choices. In reality, as laid starkly bare in the world of The Road, 
the system is so loaded and the alternatives so limited or undesirable, as to be not real choices 
but determined behaviour. On the other hand, acknowledged limits on freedom can be useful 
for the system to exonerate itself, as those in positions of power present themselves as being 
shackled into making inevitable, determined foreign and domestic policy choices, such as, 
respectively, overseas wars and economic austerity measures. And so while any semblance of 
a political system has been extinguished in the milieu of The Road, the ideological 
mystifications regarding connected phenomena such as the falsification of choice and moral 
responsibility survive from the neoliberal era in which the novel was written. 
We should also consider this issue of morality insofar as it is affected by the degree of 
choice exercised in the Man’s strenuous efforts to protect the Boy, sometimes taking the most 
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extreme measures. This should be extended, moreover, to consider The Road in the light of 
early twenty-first-century American discourse on the family. As a number of commentators 
have observed, most notably Richard Gray in After the Fall: American Literature Since 9/11, 
one widespread reaction to the events of 9/11 was a strong retrenchment of family values in 
the United States, in part as opposition to a perceived, if indistinct, threat. This family 
discourse is strongly linked to right-wing ideologies of religious fundamentalism in 
contemporary America, and thus reflects back into the religious imagery in the novel itself. 
Sheehan observes that the characterisation of the Man reflects this religious fundamentalism, 
since on the one hand, inwardly, he is Christ-like in caring for the Boy, while on the other, 
directed outwardly, he is vengeful and vindictive, an Old Testament God with regard to 
anyone who threatens them (103-5). The Man tells the Boy, for example, “[m]y job is to take 
care of you. I was appointed to do that by God. I will kill anyone who touches you” (80). The 
Man’s hypocrisy is apparent here, in that his purportedly divine but actually self-appointed 
duty of care apparently involves defying the Biblical Commandment not to kill. The man thus 
creates a false sense of purpose for himself, a point also noted by Tammis Thomas, who 
believes that the Man’s positioning of the Boy as divine, and therefore of himself as defender 
of divinity, is an ideological means to justify his actually selfish actions as altruistic and 
loving, positing himself as a “Good Guy”. This is significant insofar as the Man’s protective 
mission derives, according to his perspective, from the necessities of circumstance. He acts as 
he does based on what he perceives to be determining forces, and though this a perception 
based – unlike Chigurh’s specious use of deterministic discourse – on an act of good faith, it 
nevertheless significantly problematizes the Man’s all-consuming protectiveness. In this way, 
he uses the same justifications for violent behaviour used by the US administration at the 
time McCarthy was writing this novel, those noted in States of Exception by Giorgio 
Agamben, wherein regimes deliberately operate in a state of emergency in order to curtail 
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civil liberties at home and conduct war abroad. The Man – like the US government – is able 
to plead special circumstances in order to present his actions in a more favourable – indeed, 
divinely inspired – light. 
During course of the novel the Man kills twice to protect himself and the Boy, and is 
also merciless in his treatment of a man who attempts to steal their supplies, again evoking an 
“eye for an eye” Old Testament philosophy. He initially leaves this thief naked and shivering, 
before the Boy compels them at least to return his ragged clothing. The Boy is finally 
alienated by his father’s behaviour, so that when the latter asserts, “I wasnt going to kill him,” 
the Boy mutters, “But we did kill him” (278). The Road has divided critics in terms of its 
position with regard to the family, with a number of critics keen to take the Man’s avowed 
protectiveness at face value. Notwithstanding the admittedly perilous world of this novel, 
however, the Man’s vindictive treatment of any outsiders illustrates more clearly the dangers 
of extending isolationist “family values” rhetoric. This is never simplistic, however, since the 
insularity of the family is not straightforwardly opposed to its alternative, communities, given 
that community in The Road encompasses everything from the apparently benign group the 
Boy ultimately joins, to bands of marauding cannibals. In this respect, Cooper’s reading is 
useful, since she not only observes that the Boy is more outward-looking (“other-focused” 
[2011: 233]) than the father, as the description above of the father’s Old Testament attitude 
towards others suggests, but goes on to describe how, “[a]cting out ethical impulses, the boy 
will create a world in which ethical response is possible. Because the boy subsequently finds 
others, the narrative suggests that he is capable of finding what his father is not: goodness in 
other people” (2011: 233). The novel suggests that the Man is thus using deterministic 
elements in their existence as a means to portray his actions – no matter how apparently cruel 
– as determined, forced, and therefore either laudable or beyond moral judgement. The 
palpable if limited opposite effect of the Boy’s innocence and his occasional objections are 
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crucial in casting doubt in the reader’s mind regarding the Man’s violently defensive 
behaviour. On the other hand, comparing Chigurh with the Man reveals the subtle variations 
in how McCarthy engages with the deterministic discourse of naturalism. In both novels a 
male character uses a deterministic justification for violent events. In No Country, however, 
Chigurh deliberately employs a form of fatalism erroneously masquerading as determinism, 
moreover as a means to justify innate violent sociopathic tendencies. In The Road, by 
contrast, the Man is apparently acting in good faith, and is motivated by a desperate need to 
protect his son from demonstrably real threats. The deeply provocative similarity of the result 
in both novels, suggesting that regardless of intention either course may lead to extreme 
violence, demonstrates the complexity of McCarthy’s engagement with the conventions and 
ideologies of naturalism. 
While it may seem peculiar to be discussing moral structures in the context of an 
ostensibly deterministic narrative, the question of ethics in these dire circumstances is 
nevertheless something continually pursued in The Road. Since this question of moral 
culpability is an issue the novel persistently raises in relation to the Man, we should consider 
further his simplistically Manichean ethical code, which the Boy absorbs, albeit far from 
unquestioningly. The Man tries to divide the remaining world population into “good guys” 
and “bad guys”, and it is important to recall that the novel was written at a time when the 
American president, George W. Bush was doing very much the same thing. Even well before 
the Man’s cruel treatment of the thief, he kills a cannibalistic predator, prompting the Boy to 
ask, “Are we still the good guys?” (81) Revealingly, when posed questions such as these by 
the Boy, the Man typically supplies evasive and/or simplistic responses, in a manner 
reminiscent of President Bush’s discourse responding to the international situation in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks.7 The naturalist milieu of the novel is again crucial here, raising the 
question of the extent to which the protagonists’ actions are determined by those harshest of 
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environments in which they dwell, and therefore the extent to which they are morally 
culpable for those actions. The key point here is that some post-9/11 neo-naturalist texts 
tacitly endorse a discourse which positions America as a victim, and thus valorise 
conservative ideologies including family values discourse (for example the TV serial The 
Shield, or other narratives of the beset white male such as Jess Walter’s novel, The Financial 
Lives of the Poets). The Road, I would suggest, trains a broader perspective on the actors and 
the acted upon, and thus produces an arguably more convincing picture of global victimhood 
in the twenty-first century. 
In this respect, finally, we should consider some of The Road’s descriptions of the 
world and its remaining inhabitants, although it should first be noted that this world is 
prefigured in No Country. Much of the earlier novel takes place in similarly barren landscape, 
and Moss’s early experiences, as he returns to the now dead Mexican, lead him to feel “like 
something in a jar” (27), that is, an experimental subject, an experience which only intensifies 
as the novel progresses. Characters are, in classic naturalistic fashion, similarly confined and 
dehumanised in The Road. Early on, for example, we encounter “[c]reedless shells of men 
tottering down the causeways like migrants in a feverland. The frailty of everything revealed 
at last” (28). Such a conception of humanity is reinforced when we witness the reduction of 
human beings to mere animal bodies, for example those which the Man and Boy find in the 
back of a lorry: “Human bodies. Sprawled in every attitude. Dried and shrunken in their 
rotted clothes” (48), or the bestial man from the gang of cannibals who confronts them: “Eyes 
collared in cups of grime and deeply sunk. Like an animal inside a skull looking out the 
eyeholes” (65). Still later, our protagonists encounter the aforementioned amputee-prisoners: 
“Huddled against the back wall were naked people, male and female, all trying to hide, 
shielding their faces with their hands. On the mattress lay a man with his legs gone to the hip 
and the stumps of them blackened and burnt” (116). This episode, where a band of cannibals 
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is keeping other humans prisoner in a basement and hacking off pieces of them for food, sets 
up the clearest victimiser-victim dichotomy in the novel. Once more, the specificity 
encouraged by The Road’s naturalist form encourages us to relate such episodes to the post-
9/11 and neo-colonial context of the novel’s conception.8 In this respect, The Road’s 
perspective on victimhood is strikingly global. Mark Steven’s essay, comparing of the abject 
and animalistic condition of the humans in the post-apocalyptic setting of The Road to 
Giorgio Agamben’s notion of homo sacer, the utterly dispossessed and disposable human 
subject, is useful here. Such an understanding of the remaining humans in The Road – or, 
indeed, some of the Mexican characters in No Country – works, certainly, on an allegorical 
level, but one also congruent with naturalism. The hopeless prisoners and other destitute 
humans of these novels are the equivalent of the contemporary so-called developing world’s 
excluded, the homo sacer. Victimhood is not, as is often the case in contemporary American 
culture, confined to Americans. Instead, the predators, and here we should include even the 
Man and Boy, are ourselves, the implicated subjects and beneficiaries of capitalist 
imperialism. “The country … looted, ransacked, ravaged. Rifled of every crumb” (136-7) is 
perhaps closer to ours than we initially realise.  
 The ideological implications of McCarthy’s engagement with naturalism in his 
twenty-first-century novels are fascinating, both in relation to the other discourses in his 
novels and to the broader contemporary American culture. Certainly, with regard to the 
question posed earlier, regarding whether there is a change in McCarthy’s engagement with 
naturalism post-9/11, this essay has suggested that this is significantly the case. Indeed, both 
novels supply examples of McCarthy testing particular limits of naturalist philosophy dating 
back to Zola’s writing. No Country, through the character of Chigurh, explores the extent to 
which existentialism might be reconciled with determinism, ultimately finding that this is not 
possible unless Zola’s warnings against conflating determinism and fatalism are ignored. In 
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The Road, McCarthy constructs the most inhospitable environment possible in order to test 
just how far a naturalist experiment into human behaviour in extreme circumstances might be 
extended. In both novels, predominantly deterministic scenarios are used to frame key 
questions regarding moral issues pertinent to the period. In No Country, through Chigurh’s 
illogical and hypocritical employment of a fatalistic notion of determinism, we see a critique 
of neoliberal notions of self-reliance and responsibility. Since this neoliberal discourse is 
espoused by a sociopathic assassin, it is perhaps wisest to treat it with scepticism. As for The 
Road, as we have seen, its attitude towards the family and to the dispossessed homo sacer 
places it convincingly as another post-9/11 American text that is more inclined to use neo-
naturalism to critique than to endorse contemporary American self-conceptions, and 
neoliberal macro-politics. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Reasons for taking 9/11 as a starting point to this period become clear during the course of this essay. Using 
Trump’s election as an endpoint is simply a provisional measure.  
2 The resurgence in naturalism is also strongly reflected in the visual media of the period, including the films 
There Will Be Blood, A History of Violence, and All Is Lost (and, of course, the film adaptations of McCarthy’s 
two novels discussed herein), and prominent television series such as The Shield, The Wire, Dexter, and 
Breaking Bad/Better Call Saul. 
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3 The Sunset Limited is omitted for reasons of length, but also because its form is questionably novelistic. 
Nevertheless, it fits in with the overall thesis of the present essay, and also demonstrates marked naturalistic 
characteristics. The atheistic discourse of “White”, for example, is clearly in sympathy with philosophies also 
present in naturalism. 
4 Eric Carl Link describes McCarthy as “a southern novelist. A western novelist. An author of the grotesque, the 
perverse, the extreme. He is also – to one degree or another – a contemporary literary naturalist” (2013: 150), 
Frye reads The Crossing as an exercise in “romantic naturalism”, finding the novel “replete with passages 
reminiscent of those found in the naturalist novels of the late nineteenth and early twentieth  centuries” (2007: 
49). James Giles understands Outer Dark  as an exercise in hybridity, “a gothic romance that incorporates ideas 
and motifs of literary naturalism” (95). Bill Hardwig is something of an exception, arguing that naturalist 
tendencies rather than comprising just one element among many are actually fundamental and foundational to 
McCarthy’s fiction. 
5 For further discussion of the Just World Hypothesis see the short article by Andre and Velasquez, and Melvin 
J. Lerner’s monograph, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion  (New York: Plenum Press, 1980). 
6 See John Sepich’s concordance for The Road at 
http://www.johnsepich.com/documents/a_concordance_to_the_road_241.pdf. This confirms, for example, that 
‘ash/ashes’ appears 46 times, variations on ‘dark’ 88 times, and ‘dead/death’ 63 times. 
7 For example, Bush explaining the attacks of 9/11 as having happened “because we're the brightest beacon for 
freedom and opportunity in the world” (“Remarks”), or his declaration shortly before the war in Afghanistan 
that “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (“Freedom and Fear”). 
8 With regard to its genesis, Cooper notes that, “[t]he apocalypticism of The Road seems to be a response to an 
immediate and visceral fear of cataclysmic doom in the United States after the terrorist attacks on 9/11” (2011: 
221), and goes onto mention Dianne Luce’s assertion that McCarthy imagined the apocalyptic scenario while 
watching his son asleep, shortly after 9/11, and observation confirmed in McCarthy’s interview with David 
Kushner.  
